Sound and complete modal propositional logic C is presented, in which 2P has the interpretation \ P is true in all states". The interpretation is already known as the Carnapian extension of S5. A new axiomatization for C provides two insights. First, introducing an inference rule textual substitution allows seamless integration of the propositional and modal parts of the logic, giving a more practical system for writing formal proofs. Second, the two following approaches to axiomatizing a logic are shown to be not equivalent: (i) give axiom schemes that denote an in nite number of axioms and (ii) write a nite number of axioms in terms of propositional variables and introduce a substitution inference rule.
Introduction
Logic gives a syntactic way to derive or certify truths that can be expressed in the language of the logic. The expressiveness of the language impacts the logic's utility |the more expressive the language, the more useful the logic (at least if the intended use is to prove theorems, as opposed to, say, studying logics). We wish to calculate with logic, much as one calculates in algebra to derive equations, and we nd it useful for 2P to be a formula of the logic and have the meaning \ P is true in all states".
When a propositional logic extended with 2 is further extended to predicate logic and then to other theories, the logic can be used for proving theorems that could otherwise be handled only at the metalevel, and most likely informally. For example, the statement P is valid i 8x:P is valid is formalized in our logic as 2P 2(8x:P ) . In contrast, formalizing (1) as the two inference rules P ?!`8x : P and`8x : P ?!`P demotes it to a meta-logical notion. When the equivalence of P and 8x:P is not expressible by a formula of the logic, it is not directly available for use in calculational reasoning.
As another example, the following fact about set theory, 1 fx Qg = fx Rg is valid i Q R is valid , is formalized using 2 as 2(fx Qg = fx Rg)
2(Q R) ;
but it cannot be formalized as a formula without something like 2 . The use of the everywhere operator 2P was introduced to researchers in the formal development of programs by Dijkstra (using the notation P] ) in the early 1980's (see e.g. 5, 4] fPg S fQg : 2(P ) wp(S; Q)) :
Modal logic 2 S5 includes 2P among its formulas. As is well known, S5 is not complete with respect to model C, which consists of all states (total functions from the set of all propositional variables to ft; fg , with the conventional de nition of evaluation), where every state is accessible from every other state. For example, the formula :2p for p a propositional variable is valid with respect this model, but it is not a theorem of S5.
A number of sound an complete axiomatizations for C are known 13, 2, 1, 11, 9], dating from as early as 1973 |see Gottlob' survey 6]. In Sec. 3, we give a new axiomatization for C, compare it with previous ones, and argue why we believe the new axiomatization is more suitable for actually writing formal proofs.
The axiomatization presented in Sec. 3 uses an in nite number of axioms, speci ed by a nite set of axiom schemes. In Sec. 4 we present an axiomatization C 0 that has a nite number of axioms. We show that such a nite axiomatization cannot be obtained simply by replacing the metavariables of the axiom schemes of C of Sec. 3 by propositional variables and adding inference rule Uniform Substitution. This, then demonstrates that the two approaches to axiomatizing a logic are not necessarily equivalent. W is a nonempty set of worlds. R is an accessibility relation, a binary relation over W : w R u signi es that world u is accessible from world w . V ( ; w) , for a formula and w a world in W , is a value assignment that satis es the following properties:
is either t or f (for p a variable in VP ), V (: ; w) = if V ( ; w) = t then f else t , V ( _ ; w) = if V ( ; w) = t then t else V ( ; w) , V (2 ; w) = if V ( ; u) = t for all worlds u such that w R u then t else f .
(3)
An S5-model is a model hW; R; V i in which R is an equivalence relation |re exive, transitive, and symmetric. An S5-formula is S5-valid, written j = S5 , i for every S5-model hW; R; V i and every w in W , V ( ; w) = t . ( j = L has lowest precedence |it applies to the longest formula that follows it.)
The rst part of Table 2 is a schematic presentation of propositional logic PM. PM consists of one inference-rule scheme and four axiom schemes. The inference-rule scheme denotes the in nite set of inference rules constructed by replacing metavariables and by formulas. (Similarly for the axiom schemes.) In PM (as in all the logics in this paper), a theorem is either an axiom or the conclusion of an inference rule whose premises are theorems. We use the notation`L for \ is a theorem of logic L". (`L has lowest precedence; it applies to the longest formula that follows it.)
The second part of Table 2 extends propositional logic PM to modal logic S5, by adding one inference rule and three axioms. S5 is sound and complete with respect to S5-validity 12].
Logic C
The intended model for C is the set of all states, where a state associates a value t or f with each propositional variable and each state is accessible from all the others. In this model, 2 has the interpretation \ is true in all states". We now de ne this model formally. The third part of Table 2 extends logic S5 with inference-rule scheme Textual Substitution to yield logic C. It is easy to show that Textual Substitution preserves C-validity.
Textual Substitution and all the inference rules of S5 preserve C-validity. Also, the axioms of S5 are C-valid. Therefore, logic C is sound with respect to C-validity.
To illustrate C, we prove that :2p is a theorem. We use a calculational style of proof |see 7] or 8]. The rst formula is a C-theorem. Since the last formula equals the rst, the last is also a C-theorem. Proving completeness of logic C with respect to C-validity
We now prove that C is complete with respect to C-validity. Since C is an extension of S5, in this proof, we can use S5-theorems presented in Hughes and Cresswell 12] as C-theorems. Also, we rely on the following lemma, which follows directly from the de nition of b V (2 ; w) .
Lemma. For any formula , either j = C 2 or j = C :2 .
Hughes and Cresswell de ne ordered modal conjunctive normal form (ordered MCNF).
A formula is in ordered MCNF if it has the form C 1^: : :^C n and each C i has the form _ 2 1 _ : : : _ 2 m _ 3 ; (5) where , the i , and are propositional formulas (i.e. they don't contain 2 or 3 ).
We prove three lemmas, leading up to a proof that j = C (5) implies`C (5) .
Lemma. For propositional formula , j = C implies`C .
Proof. Suppose j = C . Since is a propositional formula, and since C contains complete propositional logic PM,`C .
Lemma. For propositional formula , j = C 3 implies`C 3 .
Proof Further, since the rst formula is a theorem (it is an instance of axiom 2-Instantiation on which Textual Substitution is performed), the last formula is also a theorem. This establishes`C 3 . Theorem. j = C (5) implies`C (5) .
Proof. Suppose j = C (5) . By Lemma (4), each of 2 i and 3 (i.e. :2: ) evaluates to f in all worlds or to t in all worlds. The proof uses a three-case analysis: 3 evaluates to t , 2 i evaluates to t for some i , and all 2 i and 3 evaluate to f in all worlds. Case 3 evaluates to t in all worlds. Then j = C 3 and, by Lemma (7),`C 3 . Note that 3 ) (5) is of the form P ) P _ Q , which is a theorem of propositional logic PM, so`C 3 ) (5) . By Modus ponens,`C (5) . Case 2 i evaluates to t in all worlds. The proof is similar to the proof of the previous case, using Lemma (8) instead of (7).
Case the 2 i and 3 evaluate to f in all worlds. Since (5), i.e. _ 2 1 _ : : : _ 2 m _ 3 , is C-valid, evaluates to true in all worlds, so j = C . The rest of this proof is similar to the proof of the rst case, using Lemma (6) instead of (7 
Corollary:`C mcnf : (11) Corollary:`C i `C mcnf : (12) Corollary: j = C i j = C mcnf : :
Corollary (11) holds because C is an extension of S5. Corollary (12) follows from (11), the de nition of abbreviation , and Modus ponens. For Corollary (13) , note that (11) together with the soundness of C yields j = C mcnf: and use properties of b V .
To prove completeness of C, we use the following properties of propositional logic (which is included in logic C) and the C model. 
Comparison with earlier complete axiomatizations
As mentioned in Sec. 1, a number of complete axiomatizations of C have been given 13, 2, 1, 11, 9]. All of them are similar in nature to the following one, which we take from 9]. Begin with Schematic S5 (see Table 2 ). Instead of adding inference rule Textual Substitution, add as axioms all formulas of the form 3 for a satis able propositional formula (i.e. a propositional formula that evaluates to t in at least one world of model C). Lemma (7) now holds trivially, and we can prove completeness with respect to C-validity in the same way that we proved completeness of C.
This axiomatization is unsatisfactory to us because it refers to the semantic notion of satis ability. However, this semantic notion can be eliminated, leading to a complete syntactic axiomatization. A propositional formula is satis able i its disjunctive normal form contains a disjunct that does not contain some literal together with its negation.
Hence, to discover whether 3 (for a propositional formula) is a theorem, convert to disjunctive normal form and determine whether one of its disjuncts contains a literal and its negation. (Private communications with Rob Goldblatt and Joe Halpern).
The resulting axiomatization is still unsatisfactory to us, because of the need to reformulate of a conjectured theorem 3 in disjunctive normal form. This reformulation is not in keeping with our usual way of proving theorems (using a calculational approach, where suitable 7, 8, 5]). For example, to prove 3 _ 3 , we would be forced to prove that one of and were satis able, rather than simply performing syntactic manipulations to obtain 3 _ 3 , as is our preference. Inference rule Textual Substitution provides an alternative that is more in tune with the way we prove theorems calculationally; it allows for a more seamless integration of proofs of the various kinds of theorems of C.
C with a nite number of axioms
An axiomatization with a nite number of axioms is usually derived from one with axiom schemes by (i) replacing the metavariables in the axiom schemes with propositional variables and (ii) introducing an inference rule to substitute formulas for propositional variables:
?!` v :
Here, is a metavariable, v is a list of propositional variables, and is a corresponding list of metavariables. The notation v denotes a copy of the formula denoted by in which all occurrences (even those within the scope of 2 ) of the variables of v are replaced by the formulas denoted by the corresponding variables of .
This method for eliminating axiom schemes does not work in the case of Schematic C of Table 2 , because (17) does not preserve C-validity. For example, :2p is C-valid (as proven earlier), but (:2p) p true , which is :2true , is not C-valid.
Instead, we obtain a sound axiomatization of C that has a nite number of axioms as follows. Modus Ponens:` ;`( ) ) ?!` Axiom A1: P _ P ) P Axiom A2: P ) P _ Q Axiom A3: P _ Q ) Q _ P Axiom A4: (Q ) R) ) (P _ Q ) P _ R) We wish to prove that C and C 0 have the same concrete theorems. To this end, call a Hilbert-style C 0 proof concrete i the only non-concrete theorems in it are axioms. This implies that an axiom is used only as the premise of an instance of Uniform Substitution whose conclusion is concrete. For example, here is a concrete proof of :p _ (p_p) ) :p_p .
1. (Q ) R) ) (P _ Q ) P _ R) In a concrete C 0 proof, each theorem that is derived using a Uniform-Substitution inference is an axiom of C. Thus, the concrete C 0 proof can be turned into an C proof simply by deleting each axiom and changing every hint \Uniform Substitution" to \Axiom". For example, the C proof corresponding to the above concrete proof is as follows. Proof. Consider an arbitrary concrete theorem and a Hilbert-style proof for it. We prove by induction on the length of its proof that there exists a concrete proof of . Since is concrete, the proof uses at least one inference rule. Below, we consider the four possibilities for the last inference rule.
Textual Substitution,` ?!` v := ] . Hence, is concrete, and by the induction hypothesis, it has a concrete proof. Since the step` ?!` v := ] does not introduce a non-concrete theorem, the result follows in this case.
Necessitation,` ?!`2 . Similar to the previous case. Modus Ponens,` ; ) ?!` . Thus,` and` ) , so by Uniform Substitution,` and` ) (recall that is already concrete). By the induction hypothesis, there are concrete proofs of and ) . Now use Modus Ponens,` ; )
?!` , to complete a concrete proof of . Uniform Substitution,` ?!` P for P a list of formula variables. Here, is P . In the left column of Table 4 are the ve ways in which the last two steps of the proof could be written. We have abbreviated the names of inference rules by their initials, and we have listed either the premises or the numbers of lines on which the premises appear in the proof. In the right column, we give alternative concrete proofs |the formulas on lines with boldface numbers are concrete formulas for which the inductive hypothesis is assumed, so they have concrete proofs. Since the remaining lines of these proofs contain concrete formulas, the proofs are concrete.
Corollary of Theorems (18), (19). For concrete formula ,`C i `C0 . Theorem. Let be a formula that does not contain both a formula variable (e.g. P ) and its propositional counterpart (e.g. p ). Then the following are all equivalent:
S5 ,`S 5 0 ,`S 5 0 ,`S 5 0 , and j = S5 .
(21) (1) ( ) ) P;Q ;q U.S. )
(2) P;Q ;q M.P. (0), (1) ( P is concrete, so P contains all formula variables in . Let Q be a list of formula variables in except those in P and let q be a corresponding list of propositional variables. Then P is concrete and P;Q ;q is the same as P .) 
